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1. Introduction 
 
On December 18, 2015, President Obama signed into law an act that repealed a forty-year old 
export ban on crude oil. The export ban was originally adopted in the 1970s in response to 
concerns about oil scarcity, and to uphold the domestic price controls introduced by President 
Nixon. Those price controls were abolished in 1981, thus eliminating the original rationale for 
the export restrictions, but the ban remained in place for decades. Its durability and supposed 
contributions to America’s energy security once made repealing the export ban “unthinkable,” 
according to a senior energy adviser to President Obama (Bordoff, 2015). Yet that is precisely 
what happened, rather suddenly, in 2015. How did this historic shift in American energy 
policy come about?  
 
In the absence of scholarly answers, some analysts offered flawed and incomplete 
explanations. For instance, media reports suggested that the decline in global oil prices in 
2014-15 drove oil companies to lobby for the policy change (Lipton and Krauss, 2015). But 
prices had declined in the past, such as in the mid-1980s, and there was no change in policy. 
Others just pointed to booming US crude production since 2008 as the main catalyst for 
change (Johnson, 2015). Yet, in spite of its fracking boom, the US remains a net oil importer, 
consuming more than it produces. Something else had to be going on to explain the sudden 
change in US policy.  
 
The answer to this puzzle lies with certain changes in the political economy of oil. More 
precisely, we argue that a multiple streams model of the policy process best explains the US 
policy shift on oil exports (Kingdon, 1984). That model suggests that policy change only 
occurs when three separate ‘streams’ come together at the same time: a recognized policy 
problem (the problem stream), a feasible policy solution (the policy stream), and a set of 
policy makers with the motive and opportunity to turn it into policy (the political stream). In 
2015, that combination was finally in place, in the context of a grand bargain to pass the 
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government’s budget and fewer concerns about potentially increasing gasoline prices for 
American motorists. The oil export decision thus serves as a potent reminder that energy 
policy-making is often less coherent than it might appear.   
 
Our analysis also speaks to the field of international relations, where energy is still 
understudied (Hughes and Lipscy, 2013; Colgan 2014a). Where they exist, studies tend to 
focus on international organizations like OPEC and the IEA rather than on national-level 
foreign policy related to energy (Van de Graaf, 2013; Colgan, 2014b). Social scientists are 
especially negligent of the political economy of energy policy (Hancock and Vivoda, 2014; 
Van de Graaf et al., 2016). Instead, research on oil and energy tends to focus on security 
dimensions (Colgan, 2010, 2013; Kelanic, 2016). Yet the security rationale for the US crude 
oil ban, to the extent that there was one, had not changed in 2015: the US remained a net 
importer of oil. To understand the policy shift, one has to look at the changing political 
economy of the US oil industry and the particularities of the policy process. 
 
This study is structured around three questions. First, why was the export ban in place for 
forty years? Second, what changed in 2015 that led Washington policymakers to remove the 
ban? And third, what are the potential international implications of lifting the ban for energy 
markets, climate change and geopolitics? 
 
2. The origins of a forty-year old oil export ban  
 
2.1 The roots of US oil trade restrictions 
 
The US began to restrict oil trade in the 1950s, at a time when rising volumes of cheap foreign 
oil threatened domestic production. In response, President Eisenhower began to limit imports 
of crude oil. The import restrictions accelerated the depletion of domestic reserves and had to 
be gradually eased in the 1960s. In the early 1970s, another interventionist policy was 
introduced when President Nixon began implementing wage and price controls, including oil 
price controls, as a means of curbing rampant inflation. While the price freezes on most goods 
were removed within the next three years, those for oil continued for the next decade. Oil 
exports were not an issue at first, as the price of crude within the United States was higher 
than on the global market, a result of US protectionist policies (Morse, 1999; Yergin, 1991). 
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Then came the 1973 Arab oil embargo, leading international oil prices to rise and causing an 
oil scarcity panic. This event triggered the Nixon administration to put in place oil export 
restrictions. Regulation was accomplished under three laws, and reflected specific motivations 
(Bradley, 1996: 770-774; Bordoff and Houser, 2015).  First, the Trans-Alaska Pipeline 
Authorization Act, passed several weeks after the Arab oil embargo in 1973, sought to 
regulate the development of Alaska’s vast North Slope oil resources, which had been 
discovered in 1968, but were held up by environmental concerns and a debate over the most 
appropriate pipeline route to ship the crude. The 1973 act cleared all legal hurdles against the 
construction of a pipeline to the port of Valdez, but it also forbid the export of the crude. The 
export ban reflected energy security concerns and it was a major victory for US maritime 
interests, since the 1920 Jones Act required that cargoes shipped between US ports be moved 
by US-flag vessels only (Bradley, 1996; Jenkins-Smith, 2001). 
 
Second, the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act (EPAA) of 1973 reflected domestic price 
controls.  In October 1973, the Arab oil embargo ratcheted up international oil prices relative 
to prices within the United States (Yergin, 1991), This gave US oil producers an incentive to 
sell abroad at higher prices, which would have undermined the domestic price regulations. 
The exports of crude and refined products were therefore quickly subjected to regulation and 
licensing under the Export Administration Act of 1969 (Bordoff and Houser, 2015).  
 
Third, the export ban under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) of 1975 
reflected the additional concern over domestic energy depletion.  Even though the Arab oil 
embargo ended in March 1974, heightened concern over oil shortages and security of supply 
persisted.1 The EPCA therefore reinforced the export ban regime. Some exceptions were 
allowed but only if they were deemed to be in the national interest (Bordoff and Houser, 
2015). 
 
2.2 Actions and attempts to weaken export restrictions 
 
In April 1979, President Jimmy Carter started a phased decontrol of crude oil prices as part of 
an effort to stimulate domestic production. It was also part of a package deal at the G7 with 
Germany and Japan promising to reflate their economies in exchange for US oil price 
                                                 
1 One common definition of energy security is “the reliable and affordable supply of energy.” (Deutch et al., 
2006:3) 
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decontrol (Ikenberry, 1988). In his very first executive order upon entering office in 1981, 
President Ronald Reagan eliminated the remaining price controls for oil and refined products.  
In the same spirit of liberalization, the Department of Commerce removed quantitative limits 
on the export of all refined products like gasoline and diesel in October 1981.  The remaining 
ban only applied to unrefined crude oil. 
 
The ban on crude oil would also come to be challenged. In 1981, for example, a proposal was 
made to lift the export ban for Japan in order to strengthen the bilateral ties and as a remedy to 
the growing US trade deficit with the country. Three years later, Senator Frank Murkowski 
(R-Alaska) undertook a more determined effort to permit crude oil exports pursuant to a treaty 
(Bradley, 1996). Those early efforts were defeated because of two reasons. First, the US crude 
export prohibition had been made more secure by the amendments to the Export 
Administration Act of 1977 and 1979, which made it extremely difficult to export oil since 
the President would have to find that such exports would “have a positive effect on consumer 
oil prices” (Perles, 1981, p. 541). Second, there was vehement opposition from vested 
interests such as the labor unions who argued that, if the oil was exported to Japan, 
“[e]mployment in shipyards and the construction industry will be exported along with Alaska 
oil” (cited in: Perles, 1981, p. 541).  
 
Eventually, some of the efforts for change bore fruit and the crude export ban became subject 
to multiple exemptions, including certain exports to Canada (1985), exports from Alaska’s 
Cook Inlet (1985), limited exports of heavy California crude oil (1992), and exports from 
Alaska’s North Slope (1996).  Even so, the core prohibition on crude oil exports remained 
intact for forty years (Bordoff and Houser, 2015). 
 
3. The political economy of repealing the ban in 2015 
 
We argue that the repeal of the ban was driven by the confluence of three interrelated factors: 
the spread in US and international crude prices, the emergence of a larger political 
constituency for the US oil industry, and globally falling oil prices. All of these ingredients 
were caused, in part, by the “shale revolution” and the rise of the US tight oil industry. Yet, 
the US oil boom, by itself, does not explain the decision to lift the ban; that requires a closer 
look at the policy process and the convergence of the three factors mentioned above.  
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3.1 The Brent-WTI spread  
 
First, oil companies had to have a compelling incentive to oppose the ban. They did not have 
one so long as the price of oil in the United States was more or less equal to the world price. 
Since the 1970s, there was more than enough domestic demand for US-produced oil because 
the country consumes far more than it produces (and imports the rest). As long as the US 
price was close to the world price, high or low, the US producers were quite content to sell 
their oil to Americans.  
 
Starting in 2011, US prices began moving away from world prices (see Figure 1). West Texas 
Intermediate (WTI) offers a reasonable indicator of US prices, whereas Brent Crude is a good 
benchmark for world prices; the difference between them is called the spread. WTI 
historically traded at a premium of about $1-$3 a barrel above Brent. After 2011, the WTI 
price was considerably lower than the Brent price, sometimes by as much as $20 per barrel. 
The spread was primarily due to a glut of oil trapped in the US, linked to inadequate transport 
infrastructure (pipelines, rail transport, and barge traffic) to move the crude from production 
fields and storage locations (including Cushing, Oklahoma) to refining centers, particularly 
the Gulf Coast (AFPM, 2015; API, 2015; Kilian, 2016). 
 
Figure 1. The Brent-WTI spread was historically large between 2011 and 2015 
 
 
Source: US Energy Information Administration 
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The question can be raised whether it was, in fact, the transportation bottleneck in Cushing 
that was holding back US crude from reaching world markets, rather than the export ban. One 
way to separate the transportation bottleneck effects from the export ban effects is to compare 
the prices of WTI with those of Louisiana Light Sweet (LLS), a crude of similar quality 
produced offshore in the Gulf of Mexico, shown in Fig. 2.  From 2011 onwards, landlocked 
WTI fell compared to coastal LLS, reflecting transportation bottlenecks (point a). However, 
by late 2013, the transportation bottleneck had been alleviated thanks to the reversing of 
existing oil pipelines originally running from Texas to Cushing, the opening of new pipelines 
to Texas refineries, and an increase in rail transport of oil (Kilian, 2016). As a result, LLS also 
fell with regard to Brent and came to track WTI more closely (point b). Here, the price 
differential between Brent and WTI could no longer be attributed to transportation 
bottlenecks. The remaining difference was due to regulatory barriers, in the form of the crude 
export ban.  
 
Figure 2. What prevented exports, transportation bottlenecks or the export ban? 
 
Source: Energy Information Administration 
Notes: At point a, WTI falls compared to LLS reflecting transportation bottlenecks. At point b, 
LLS falls to Brent and converges with WTI, reflecting the export ban.  
 
a 
b 
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The Brent-WTI spread meant that US oil producers were selling their oil for less than they 
could get on the world market, yet the export ban prevented access to the world market. The 
spread in 2015 was smaller than it had been in 2011-2013, but it still generated a significant 
financial incentive. Up until August 2015, the spread hovered in the $5-8 per barrel range. 
Although small on a per-barrel basis, that meant a big loss in revenue for oil producers as a 
whole. With oil production running at about 9 million barrels per day, the price spread cost 
US oil producers roughly $16-26 billion dollars annually in the aggregate. Even for an 
individual producer like Continental Resources that produced about 50 million barrels in 
2015, the price spread meant lower revenues of $250-400 million. 
 
Not surprisingly, oil producers wanted the ban to go, but oil refineries benefitted from it. 
Because of the ban, US refineries were able to buy low-priced US crude oil, refine it, and then 
sell those products at (high) world market prices. As mentioned, all restrictions on refined 
product had been lifted since 1981. This meant that all rents from lower crude prices in the 
US accrued to the refiners, not US consumers (Kilian, 2016). US oil producers argued that the 
American refinery system was fitted to process heavy petroleum, not the light, sweet crude oil 
that represented the increase in domestic production (API, 2015). Yet US refiners asserted 
that they could absorb growing production from US tight oil plays, provided that some 
additional investments in refining and infrastructure were made (AFPM, 2015). 
 
The result was a political contest that pit different parts of the oil industry against one another, 
each proposing a different policy solution: lifting restrictions on oil exports (producers) or 
investing in more refinery and transport capacity at home (refiners). The refineries had an 
unusual set of informal allies in their corner: environmentalists, who liked the ban because it 
discouraged oil production and its accompanying environmental hazards; and motorists, who 
feared that lifting the ban would raise gasoline prices at the pump (Reuters, 2015). The 
motorists’ fear was largely unfounded. A study by the Energy Information Administration, for 
instance, found that petroleum product prices in the United States, including gasoline prices, 
would be either unchanged or slightly reduced by the removal of export restrictions on crude 
oil (EIA, 2015).  
 
The concentrated benefits (for the oil industry) and costs (for the refiners) of lifting the ban, 
compared to the diffuse perceived costs for motorists and environmentalists, explains why it 
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was more difficult for the latter groups to organize themselves politically (Olson, 1965). That 
gave the oil industry a major lobbying advantage. 
 
3.2 The US oil industry’s growing constituency 
 
The second key factor behind the repeal was the rise of the tight oil industry, associated with 
fracking and horizontal drilling, which strengthened the case of the oil companies. In the five 
years leading up to the repeal, tight oil became big business in states such as North Dakota 
and Texas (Labor Market Information Center, 2016). It employed hundreds of thousands of 
people and was responsible for a significant portion of the job growth during Obama’s 
presidency (Lipton and Krauss, 2015).  
 
The oil industry used its growing economic clout to lobby for the repeal of the ban. The CEOs 
of major firms like Chevron and Conoco-Philips publicly identified the repeal as a top 
priority, and repeatedly lobbied for it (Meyers, 2015). The oil industry was also a dominant 
funder at public policy think tanks that were, at the same time, espousing the same claims in 
favor of repealing the ban (Mikulka, 2015).  
 
The oil industry’s claim that ending the export ban would create jobs and boost profits proved 
highly effective. Republican Representative Joe Barton of Texas, Democratic Senator Heidi 
Heitkamp of North Dakota, and Republican Senator Lisa Murkowski of Alaska led the fight 
against the export ban (Lipton and Krauss, 2015). Not coincidentally, many jobs, votes, and 
campaign contributions are all directly tied to the oil industry in those states (Sontag, 2014).  
 
Even with a growing constituency in the tight oil industry, though, supporters of the ban put 
up stiff resistance to a policy change. Refineries formed lobby groups, such as Crude 
Coalition, and argued they were able to absorb any additional supplies, making it unnecessary 
to lift export restrictions to balance the market (AFPM, 2015). Environmentalists lobbied on 
the same side as the refineries, using an entirely different set of arguments. And in October 
2015, the Obama administration even threatened to veto a House bill that would lift the 
federal ban on crude oil exports. 
 
3.3 Falling crude prices 
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The third key factor was falling oil prices since mid-2014, bringing down oil producers’ 
profits. The pain in the oil sector was intense. By the fall of 2015, the number of active oil 
rigs had fallen by more than half since mid-2014, and oil companies were cutting costs just to 
stay alive. The slump in oil prices had even given rise to so-called “zombie companies”—that 
is, oil and gas production companies with enough cash to service their debts, but not enough 
to drill any new wells to replace older ones (Driver and Rucinski, 2015). They were desperate 
for additional earnings, and ending the export ban offered a way. 
 
Low oil prices helped to repeal the ban in a second way, namely by easing consumers’ anxiety 
about gasoline prices. Polling had shown that the vast majority of voters in both parties 
believed that ending the ban would have raised gasoline prices at the pump—a notion that 
many proponents sought to debunk (Reuters, 2014). This popular belief made many in 
Congress reluctant to lift the ban, fearing the political repercussions of any increase in 
gasoline prices. The politics of ending the ban were thus easier with low oil prices.  
 
3.4 Putting the factors together 
 
Prior to 2011, oil companies had no reason to end the ban even when oil prices fell; after 
2011, oil companies had a profit motive for the repeal and gained power and voice. The 
Brent-WTI spreads were huge during the period 2011-2013, yet no policy shift occurred. In 
late 2015, the export ban was finally lifted even though WTI was no longer traded at a major 
discount compared to Brent. The spread had gradually closed since 2013 because of increased 
transportation capacity. If the ban had been lifted earlier, large-scale US oil exports would 
have been impeded by the lack of transportation capacity (Kilian, 2016). Even so, the oil 
industry continued its campaign, because the price spread had not entirely disappeared and the 
industry feared that it could return. Moreover, by that time, the lobby campaign had a certain 
momentum of its own: various actors had already finished cost-benefit analyses of the export 
ban that suggested repeal and other people were on record calling for a repeal of the ban, etc. 
 
The multiple streams model of the policy process perhaps best explains why policy shifted in 
2015, rather than a few years earlier (Kingdon, 1984). That model suggests that policy change 
only occurs when there is the combination of three streams. First, there has to be a recognized 
policy problem. For decades, the export ban was not perceived as a problem because there 
was no price incentive for US producers to prefer exports to domestic sales, and the domestic 
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market was more than sufficient in size. That trend reversed in 2011, when US domestic and 
international oil prices began to diverge. Thus, oil companies advocated the repeal of the ban 
with the support of policy-makers from oil-rich states.  
 
Second, a feasible policy solution must be available. Between 2011 and 2014, the oil 
industry’s preferred solution to repeal the ban ran into objections from refiners and motorists 
(who liked the ban because it kept domestic crude prices in check) and from 
environmentalists (who saw the ban as a means to keep oil in the ground).  But the opposition 
of the refiners and motorists weakened in 2014, in the former case because of convergence in 
the US and international crude prices, in the latter because of the fall in world oil prices since 
mid-2014. These low oil prices, at the same time, greatly increased the incentive for producers 
to lobby for a repeal. That made policy-makers more receptive to the demands for a repeal of 
the export ban.   
 
Third, there needs to be a set of policy–makers with the motive and opportunity to enact a 
policy change. In 2015, a grand bargain to pass the government’s budget provided a window 
of opportunity to finally lift the ban. Thanks to the lower oil prices, there was a general easing 
of consumer anxiety over gasoline prices, which eliminated an important motive for Congress 
to uphold the ban.  In addition, the environmentalist groups were able to link the repeal of the 
ban with an extension of tax credits for wind and solar energy in the 2015 budget deal—a 
classic legislative bargain.  
 
Table 1 schematically summarizes the shifting positions and preferences of key interest 
groups and the critical importance of crude oil prices. When oil prices were high, there was 
really only one group advocating the repeal of the ban (major oil producers) and, even then, 
the oil companies had relatively low motivation because the high oil prices generated huge 
profits for them.  The opposing groups either had stronger preferences (e.g., refiners) or were 
electorally more salient (e.g., motorists). When oil prices fell, the oil companies began to 
pursue the lifting of the ban with more vigor because of the industry crisis; they also had the 
ear of politicians because low oil prices led to job losses in the sector. As noted earlier, low 
oil prices and spreads reduced opposition from motorists and refiners. The opposition from 
environmental groups was bought off with a package deal that included support for 
renewables. 
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Table 1: Shifting positions of key interest groups in oil export ban debate, 2011-2015 
Key interest 
groups 
2011-2014: high oil prices 2014-2015: low oil prices 
Position Motive Preference 
intensity 
Position Motive Preference intensity 
Oil producing 
companies 
Pro 
repeal 
Foregone 
revenue 
Medium: 
profits are 
high 
anyway 
Pro 
repeal 
Bring relief 
to an industry 
in crisis 
High: this is no 
longer about 
maximizing 
revenues that are 
already high, but 
about averting 
crisis in the 
industry and saving 
jobs 
Refiners Against 
repeal 
Profit 
from price 
differential 
High: due 
to huge 
Brent-
WTO 
spread 
Against 
repeal 
Profit from 
price 
differential 
Medium: price gap 
is closing and 
international crude 
prices are also low 
Environmental 
groups 
Against 
repeal 
Keep oil in 
the ground 
Medium  Against 
repeal 
Keep oil in 
the ground 
Medium but the 
extension of tax 
credits for solar and 
wind eased some 
anxiety of 
environmental 
groups 
Motorists Against 
repeal 
Keep fuel 
prices in 
check 
High: fuel 
prices are 
high  
No 
clear 
position 
Fuel prices 
are 
declining/low 
and thus less 
of an issue 
(Not applicable) 
 
OUTCOME 
 
BAN UPHELD 
 
BAN LIFTED 
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4. The implications of lifting the ban 
 
Looking forward, what are the potential international implications of the repeal for oil 
markets, geopolitics and climate change? In 2015, the US was the world’s largest oil producer 
(BP, 2016), so it seems reasonable to expect the effects of the policy reversal to reverberate 
globally—but do they really? Economically, the EIA did not expect that lifting the ban would 
have much of an impact on US production (EIA, 2015). Even in its “high” scenario, the EIA 
estimated that US production would increase by a maximum of 220,000 barrels a day, on 
average, between 2016 and 2025, compared to leaving the export ban in place. Similarly, the 
EIA expected prices to remain largely unaffected because US refineries would still be able to 
absorb all the oil that the US produces. 
 
Geopolitically, repealing the ban does not mean that the US is suddenly in a position to use its 
oil exports as a diplomatic tool, since oil is still traded on what is probably the “largest and 
most liquid commodity market on earth” (Bordoff and Houser, 2015). The existence of such a 
globally integrated oil market also implies that the goal of “energy independence,” invoked by 
every US President since Nixon, is an empty slogan. Lifting the export ban does bring 
benefits for the US in other ways, though. First, it facilitates the role of the US tight oil 
industry in mitigating price volatility. The US tight oil industry has a much shorter investment 
cycle and is less capital intensive than other marginal crude sources, enabling it to react faster 
to changes in global prices (IEA, 2015). And, second, it eliminates a long-standing tension in 
the American position on trade policy: the US oil export ban was incongruent with its position 
in favor of free trade in almost all other sectors. 
 
Environmentally, any benefit created by the ban in terms of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions was probably small (EIA, 2015), and in any case represented an inefficient way to 
restrict those emissions (Bordoff and Houser, 2015). Still, environmentalists’ objections 
ensured that the Congressional deal to repeal the ban was accompanied by an extension of tax 
credits for wind and solar energy. One analysis of the environmental benefits of the solar and 
wind tax credits suggests that they are relatively large, about 40 million metric tons of 
avoided carbon dioxide emissions annually, certainly larger than any benefits associated with 
leaving the export ban in place (Levi, 2015).  
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5. Conclusion and policy implications 
 
The Congressional action in 2015 to repeal the forty-year old ban on US crude oil exports 
represented a significant shift in policy. A year prior to the repeal, experts viewed the policy 
change as highly unlikely, based on persistent partisan gridlock in Congress (Lipton and 
Krauss, 2015). Yet a combination of three factors created the right conditions for the ban to be 
lifted: the significant spread between US and world oil prices, a steep decline in oil prices, 
and a Congressional budget deal. In the end, repealing the ban was accomplished with 
remarkable speed. 
 
While the decision to lift export restrictions on crude oil represents a historic change in US 
energy policy, the implications for oil markets, geopolitics, and climate change are likely to 
be modest. Both proponents and opponents have probably overplayed their case during the 
export ban debate, in an attempt to mobilize support for their respective cause. The deal 
represents neither a “disaster for the climate” (Smith, 2015) nor does it endow the US with a 
“powerful new foreign policy tool” (McCaul, 2015).  
 
What it does show is that, in spite of the rhetorical support for ‘energy independence’ by 
every US president since the 1970s, there is actually a huge degree of ‘interdependence’ 
between the domestic and international spheres. The US fracking boom has helped to bring 
down global oil prices since 2014.  This, in turn, has helped to shift the domestic debate 
within the US over the repeal of the export ban in favor of the oil companies.  With WTI and 
Brent prices now closely aligned again, the US fracking industry might help to mitigate the 
price volatility that has plagued the oil industry for so long.  Energy policy choices in the US 
are thus heavily conditioned by global market circumstances, which in turn are molded by 
national political processes in the major oil producers and consumers.   
 
More broadly, this case offers lessons for the political economy of energy policy choices of 
import dependent countries beyond just the United States. The political dynamics of the 
export ban and its repeal suggests that the energy policies of importing countries cannot be 
simply assumed from their macroeconomic situation, treating the state as a unitary rational 
actor. Instead, policy outcomes are the product of various competing interest groups’ 
preferences, understood within the context of a multiple streams model of public policy.
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